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Two DowN, ELEVEN TO Go:
CREATING A CANADIAN SEC OR
SOMETHING LIKE IT
John J. Kappel*ON September 19, 2013, Canada's Minister of Finance, Jim Fla-
herty, Ontario's Minister of Finance, Charles Sousa, and British
Columbia's Minister of Finance, Mike de Jong, announced the
creation of the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulator (CCMR).1 The
CCMR is being created to serve as a new Canadian securities regulator,
2
partially unifying Canada's current securities regulation system, which is
almost entirely administered at the provincial and territorial level.3 The
first section of this article will outline the current method of Canadian
securities regulation, the second section will discuss the 2011 attempt by
the Canadian Parliament to create a single federal securities regulator
and the Canadian Supreme Court's advisory opinion against the creation
of such a regulator, and the third section will explore the recently pro-
posed CCMR and the effects that the creation of the CCMR might have
on Canadian securities regulation.
I. THE CURRENT METHOD OF CANADIAN SECURITIES
REGULATION: A COMMITMENT TO
DECENTRALIZATION
Currently, Canadian securities regulation is done entirely at the re-
gional level; there is no national Canadian Securities regulator.4 Securi-
ties are regulated by thirteen independent agencies, one for each of
Canada's ten provinces and three territories.5 In this respect, Canada
possesses the unique, although perhaps not positive, distinction of being
the only major industrialized country in the world to not have a single
* John Kappel is a third-year student at SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. Gordon Isfeld & Barbara Shecter, Jim Flaherty: Ottawa, B.C. and Ontario Agree to




3. Who We Are, CANADIAN SECURIIEIFS ASSOCIATION, http://www.securities-
administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=77 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
4. See id.
5. Id.
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national securities regulator. 6 However, the thirteen regulators have
achieved a certain degree of unity through their membership in the Cana-
dian Securities Association (CSA). 7
A. THE CANADIAN SECURITIES ASSOCIATION
The CSA refers to itself as an "umbrella organization" comprising all
of the provincial and territorial regulators and created to "improve, coor-
dinate and harmonize regulation of the Canadian capital markets."8
While the CSA "umbrella" does effectively facilitate cooperation and a
certain degree of uniformity between the provincial and territorial regula-
tors, the CSA itself is not a true regulatory body. 9
Ultimately, the provincial and territorial securities regulators function
independently of the CSA and each other to investigate complaints and
manage enforcement issues and proceedings within each regulator's re-
spective jurisdiction.10 The direct consequence of this fragmented group
of regulators is an increased degree of red tape and paperwork encoun-
tered by anyone who works in the securities industry and who wishes to
operate in more than one province or territory.11
In an effort to interconnect the regulatory schemes of the thirteen pro-
vincial and territorial regulators and alleviate the burden that can come
with having to comply with multiple regulators, the CSA created the
Passport System.' 2 The goal of the Passport System is to give market
participants "automatic access to the capital markets in other jurisdictions
by obtaining a decision only from [the market participant's] principal reg-
ulator and meeting the requirements of one set of harmonized laws."'13
To this end, each market participant falls within the jurisdiction of one of
the thirteen regulators, dubbed the market participant's "principal regu-
6. Barbie McKenna, Steven Chase, Janet McFarland & Sophie Cousineau, Ottawa
Renews Push for National Securities Regulator, Tili GLOBE AND MAl., http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/flaherty-new-securities-regulator/
articlel4407154/ (last updated Sept. 20, 2013).
7. The thirteen regulators that are members of the CSA are: the Alberta Securities
Commission, the British Columbia Securities Commission, The Manitoba Securi-
ties Commission, the Financial and Consumer Services Commission (New Bruns-
wick), the Office of the Superintendent of Securities Service Newfoundland and
Labrador, the Northwest Territories Securities Office, the Nova Scotia Securities
Commission, the Nunavut Securities Office, the Ontario Securities Commission,
the Office of the Superintendent of Securities (Prince Edward Island), Autorit6
des marchds financiers (Quebec), the Financial and Consumer Affairs Authority of
Saskatchewan, and the Office of the Superintendent of Securities (Yukon). CSA
Members, CANADIAN SEcuIrIs ASSOCIATION, http://www.securities-admini
strators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=80 (last visited Mar. 34, 2014).
8. Overview, CANADIAN SEcuiriEs ASSOCIATION, http://www.securities-admini
strators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=45 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. McKenna et al., supra note 6.
12. Pan-Canadian Regulatory Cooperation, CANADIAN SECURITIEiS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=96 (last visited Mar. 24,
2014).
13. Id.
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lator.' 1 4 Once a market participant complies with any requirements set
forth by its principal regulator, it is deemed to have complied with the
requirements of the other regulators.
15
One rather distinctive flaw with the Passport System is the fact that the
Ontario Securities Commission does not participate in it.16 Unlike the
twelve other securities regulators, the Ontario Securities Commission in-
sists on making its own regulatory decisions.' 7 Fortunately, the twelve
Passport-participating regulators do accept regulatory decisions of the
Ontario Securities Commission, making this only a unilateral
disconnect.1 8
II. THE SECURITIES ACT: PARLIAMENT'S THOUGHT
EXPERIMENT IN COMPREHENSIVE CENTRALIZATION
After decades of considering the creation of a national securities regu-
lator and with a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the limited uniform-
ity that the CSA was able to bring to Canadian securities regulation, 9 the
Parliament of Canada proposed the Securities Act with the intent of creat-
ing "a single Canadian securities regulator supported by a comprehensive
statutory and regulatory regime that applies across Canada. '20 The Ca-
nadian Parliament elected to unify securities regulation by creating a sin-
gle national entity to displace the provincial and territorial regulators.
21
Parliament indicated that the Securities Act was designed to provide
improved protection for investors,22 "foster fair, efficient and competitive
capital markets" in Canada,2 3 and "to contribute.., to the integrity and
stability of [Canada's existing] financial system."'24 To meet these goals,
Parliament intended to enact: registration requirements for securities
dealers, 2 5 prospectus filing requirements,26 disclosure requirements,
27
specific duties for market participants,2 8 a framework for the regulation
of derivatives,2 9 private civil remedies,30 and regulatory and criminal of-







19. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, paras. 11-28 (Can.).
20. Proposed Canadian Securities Act, Order in Council P.C. 2010-667, preamble.
21. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. para. 2.
22. Proposed Canadian Securities Act, Order in Council P.C. 2010-667, § 9(a).
23. Id. § 9(b).
24. Id. § 9(c).
25. Id. pt. 5.
26. Id. pt. 6.
27. Id. pt. 8.
28. Id. pt. 10.
29. Id. pt. 7.
30. Id. pt. 12.
31. Id. pt. 11.
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Likely realizing that not all of the provincial and territorial regulators
would welcome the creation of a single national regulator, Parliament
drafted the Securities Act so that its provisions would only apply to prov-
inces and territories that opted-in to be under the authority of the na-
tional regulator. 32 Nevertheless, on May 26, 2010, 33 the Canadian
Governor in Council petitioned the Supreme Court of Canada to issue an
advisory opinion ruling on whether the Securities Act fell within the scope
of Parliament's legislative authority. 34
A. SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S ADVISORY OPINION ON THE
SECURITIES ACr
On December 22, 2011, 35 the Supreme Court of Canada released the
requested advisory opinion 36 accessing whether Parliament had the legis-
lative authority to pass the proposed Securities Act.37 The Attorney Gen-
eral of Canada and intervener Attorney General of Ontario argued that
the Securities Act falls within Parliament's general power to regulate
trade and commerce. 38 The Attorneys General of Alberta, Quebec,
Manitoba, and New Brunswick intervened and argued that the Securities
Act intrudes upon provincial legislative authority.39 The Attorneys Gen-
eral for British Colombia and Saskatchewan also opposed the Securities
Act, but were not against the concept of a national securities regulator in
principal, so long as the national regulator was designed to respect the
division of authority between the federal government and the
provinces.40
In support of the Securities Act, the Canadian government argued that
the Canadian securities markets expanded over time from local markets
to a national market with nationwide implications. 41 The government
further argued that this evolution of the securities market gave the fed-
eral government concurrent jurisdiction to regulate the securities market
alongside the provinces and territories. 42 The federal government pos-
sesses the broad authority to regulate national trade and commerce and it
argued that this power grants Parliament the ability to pass the Securities
Act.
4 3
In conducting its analysis the Supreme Court of Canada took note of
32. Id. pmbl.
33. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. at 837.
34. Id. para. 1.
35. Id. at 837.
36. The Supreme Court of Canada has authority to issue advisory opinions. Supreme
Court Act, R.S.C 1985, c. S-26, at § 53.
37. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. para. 1.
38. Id. para. 32.
39. Id. para. 34.
40. Id. para. 35.
41. Id. para. 4.
42. Id.
43. Id. para. 5.
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the decisions of the Quebec Court of Appeal 44 and the Alberta Court of
Appeal45 who both declared the Securities Act unconstitutional.46 The
Supreme Court also examined the legal basis for the provincial securities
regulation 47 and the nature of national securities regulation in foreign
countries including Germany,48 Australia,49 and most notably, the United
States.50 The Court paid particular attention to the U.S. Constitution's
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause which allow U.S. states to regu-
late securities at the local level, the federal government to regulate securi-
ties between the states, and for federal laws regulating securities to trump
similar state laws when the two are in direct conflict with each other.
5
'
The Supreme Court took particular note of the fact that the regulatory
system with federal preemption crafted in the United States does not
foreclose the ability of the states to have a role in the regulatory pro-
cess. 52 The Supreme Court also took the time to recount Canada's princi-
ples of federalism in general 53 and the particular nature of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the scope of the federal government's trade and
commerce power. 54
After analyzing the proposed Securities Act, the Supreme Court came
to the conclusion that certain provisions within the act were a valid exer-
cise of Parliament's trade and commerce power because the Canadian
securities market is too large and economically important to be fully and
properly regulated by the provinces and territories alone.55 However, the
Supreme Court ultimately found that the proposed Securities Act went
well beyond simply augmenting provincial and territorial securities regu-
lation and amounted to a "wholesale takeover of the regulation of
securities." '56
Finally, the Supreme Court indicated that it believed the primary focus
of the proposed act, or the act's "pith and substance," was not regulation
of nationwide economic risk, but rather protecting investors and ensuring
market fairness.57 Unfortunately for the Canadian government, the Su-
preme Court found the latter two objectives to fall squarely within the
powers of the provinces and territories, making the Securities Act's pri-
mary objectives an unconstitutional intrusion on provincial powers.58
44. Id. para. 38.
45. Id. para. 37.
46. Id. para. 36.
47. Id. para. 43.
48. Id. para. 49.
49. Id. para. 50.
50. Id. paras. 51-52.
51. Id. para. 51.
52. Id. para. 52.
53. Id. paras. 54-67.
54. Id. paras. 68-90.
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As a consolation prize, the Supreme Court indicated that a hypotheti-
cal cooperative regulatory scheme where the federal government would
address systemic security market risk and national economic concerns
while provincial and territorial regulators would regulate investor protec-
tion and market fairness.59 In support of this hypothetical cooperative
approach, the Supreme Court noted that other countries with national
securities regulators reserve certain aspects of regulation for local regula-
tors instead of condensing all regulatory authority in a single national
regulator. 6
0
III. THE COOPERATIVE CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATOR:
AN ASPIRATION FOR COOPERATION AND A
MIDDLE GROUND
Less than two years after the Supreme Court decided Reference re Se-
curities Act, the Canadian Minster of Finance, along with the Ministers of
Finance for Ontario and British Columbia, reached an agreement to cre-
ate a cooperative securities regulator, the CCMR, 61 very similar to the
one contemplated by the Supreme Court in the closing remarks of its
Securities Act opinion.62 The announcement indicated that the new coop-
erative securities regulator will provide increased protection for investors,
make improvements to Canada's financial services sector, and "support
efficient capital markets and manage systemic risk."'63 The cooperative
system has been designed with the goals of preserving the current ability
to weigh and consider local perspectives and achieving "needed reforms
within a national context. '64
The CCMR will accomplish these goals by creating a "uniform act" for
each participating jurisdiction that addresses everything currently ad-
dressed by provincial and territorial legislation.65 A single complemen-
tary federal act that addresses national data collection and problems like
system risk will also be created. The act will conform to the goals that
federal securities legislation may properly pursue according to the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Reference re Securities Act.66 Both the provin-
cial acts and the federal acts will be administered by the CCMR under
authority delegated to the CCMR by the federal government and the par-
59. Id. para. 131.
60. Id.
61. Ministers of Finance of British Columbia, Ontario and Canada Agree to Establish a
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulator, Di P'r OF FIN. CAN. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://
www.fin.gc.ca/nl3/13-119-eng.asp [hereinafter Ministers of Finance].
62. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. paras. 128, 131; Ministers of Finance
supra note 61.
63. Ministers of Finance supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. Backgrounder: Agreed Elements of a Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory Sys-
tem, DizP'-r OF FIN. CAN. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.fin.gc.ca/n]3/data/13-119_1-
eng.asp.
66. Id.
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ticipating provinces and territories. 67
The type of cooperative regulator outlined in the Department of Fi-
nance's announcement is very much in line with the type of regulator that
the government of British Columbia was advocating for when the Securi-
ties Act was being challenged. 68 The Minsters of Finance for Canada and
Ontario have evidently come to agree with British Columbia in this re-
spect and have invited the other eight provinces and three territories to
participate in the new cooperative system.69 It remains to be seen how
many, if any, additional provinces and territories will choose to partici-
pate in the CCMR. Alberta and Quebec almost immediately announced
their intentions to not participate in the new regulatory system.
70
With a target implementation date of July 2015,71 there is ample time
for more provinces and territories to elect to participate in the CCMR.
The fact that the CCMR's initial draft regulations will not be published
until April 30, 2014 creates a great deal of uncertainty with respect to the
details of the new regulatory scheme.72 But this has not stopped a consid-
erable number of people from expressing support; response to the an-
nouncement of the CCMR has been largely positive.73 Evidently, the
prospect of having something closer to a national securities regulator is
akin to the light at the end of a long tunnel. Canada's Minster of Finance
seems particularly proud of the announcement which is not surprising
considering he has been trying to reform Canada's system of securities
regulation since 2006.74 The CCMR is in its infancy, only two provinces
have agreed to participate in it so far. While it will be not as significant a
change to Canada's system of securities regulation that some hoped for,
even if every province and territory were to participate, it is a significant
step in the right direction that holds significant promise for the future of
Canadian securities regulation.
67. Id.
68. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. para. 35; Ministers of Finance supra
note 61.
69. Ministers of Finance supra note 61.
70. McKenna, Chase, McFarland & Cousineau, supra note 6.
71. Isfeld & Shecter, supra note 1.
72. Id. The release date "for the draft provincial capital markets legislation, draft com-
plementary federal legislation, and CCMR memorandum of agreement" was ex-
tended to April 30, 2014. Statement Regarding Establishment of a Cooperative
Capital Markets Regulator, DE P'T OF FIN. CAN. (Jan. 31, 2014), http:/
www.fin.gc.ca/nl4/14-015-eng.asp.
73. Isfeld & Shecter, supra note 1; McKenna, Chase, McFarland & Cousineau, supra
note 6.
74. Isfeld & Shecter, supra note 1.
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